Corporate Governance Across Emerging Markets

For global investors and owner-managers alike, corporate governance in emerging markets is no longer a peripheral concern. It sits at the heart of capital allocation, risk management, and long-term value creation. China, Brazil, and South Korea offer three distinct but instructive governance stories—each shaped by history, ownership structures, and regulatory choices. Examined together, they reveal how governance frameworks evolve, where tensions persist, and what practical lessons can be drawn for investors and controlling families.

China’s corporate governance system has developed rapidly over the past three decades, largely in tandem with the country’s gradual transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented one. Early reforms in the 1990s focused on corporatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and introducing stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Governance in this phase was heavily state-centric: boards existed, but real authority often rested with government bodies and Party committees. Over time, China introduced a modern company law, independent director requirements, audit committees, and disclosure rules broadly aligned with international practice. Today, governance is shaped by a dual structure. On the one hand, the China Securities Regulatory Commission enforces listing rules, disclosure standards, and corporate governance codes similar in form to those in developed markets. On the other hand, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission represents the state as controlling shareholder in major SOEs, influencing board appointments, executive incentives, and strategic direction. For a major investor, the opportunity lies in China’s scale, liquidity, and improving transparency; the risk lies in understanding that control rights, political priorities, and shareholder value do not always align in the same way as in Anglo-American markets. Effective due diligence therefore requires not only financial analysis, but also a clear view of ownership, state influence, and regulatory signaling.

Brazil offers a contrasting governance journey, one driven less by the state and more by capital market innovation. Historically, Brazilian companies were characterized by concentrated ownership, extensive use of non-voting shares, and weak minority protection. In response, Brazil’s stock exchange introduced differentiated listing segments, most notably Novo Mercado, which raised governance standards beyond minimum legal requirements. These reforms demonstrated that better governance can be market-led and value-enhancing. One particularly relevant lesson from Brazil for family-owned enterprises is the role of structured family governance mechanisms, especially the family council. For a large family company now owned by two generations, a family council can serve as a formal forum to separate family matters from business management. The benefits include clearer communication across generations, agreed principles on dividends, succession, and employment of family members, and reduced risk of conflict spilling into the boardroom. It also helps professionalize decision-making without diluting family control. The costs are real but manageable: time commitment, the need for facilitation or external advisors, and the risk that poorly designed councils become symbolic rather than effective. The Brazilian experience shows that when family councils are clearly mandated, linked to but distinct from the board, and focused on long-term stewardship, they can significantly enhance both family harmony and corporate resilience.

South Korea illustrates yet another governance model, dominated by large business groups known as chaebol. Many of the country’s most prominent listed companies—such as Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor, and SK Hynix—are globally competitive firms with sophisticated operations, yet their governance has long been shaped by founding-family control. Samsung Electronics provides a useful example. It has strengthened formal governance practices over the past decade by increasing board independence, separating the roles of chair and CEO in practice, enhancing disclosure, and engaging more actively with international investors. At the same time, ultimate control remains closely linked to the founding Lee family through ownership structures and influence within the wider Samsung Group. This creates a hybrid governance model: outwardly aligned with global best practices, but internally anchored in family and group control. For investors, the key insight is not to assume convergence automatically means convergence in substance. Instead, governance must be assessed in terms of how effectively boards can challenge controlling shareholders, manage succession, and balance group interests with those of minority investors.

Taken together, these three cases underline a central theme in emerging-market governance: form is converging faster than substance. Codes, committees, and disclosure frameworks increasingly resemble those of developed markets, yet underlying power structures—state ownership in China, family capitalism in Brazil, and chaebol control in South Korea—continue to shape outcomes. For investors, this means governance analysis must go beyond box-ticking and focus on who really controls strategy and capital. For owner-managers, especially in family firms, the lesson is equally clear: well-designed governance mechanisms such as family councils and independent boards are not constraints, but enablers of continuity, credibility, and long-term value creation.

新興市場的企業管治

對全球投資者與企業擁有人而言，企業管治早已不再只是合規或附屬議題，而是資本配置、風險管理與長期價值創造的核心。中國、巴西與南韓提供了三種截然不同、卻同樣具啟發性的企業管治發展路徑。這些路徑深受歷史、所有權結構與監管選擇所塑造，放在一起觀察，有助我們理解企業管治如何演進、其內在張力何在，以及投資者與控股家族可汲取的實務經驗。

中國的企業管治體系在過去三十年間迅速發展，並與其由計劃經濟逐步轉向市場導向的改革進程緊密相連。九十年代初期的改革重點在於將國有企業公司化，並成立上海與深圳證券交易所。當時的管治模式高度以國家為中心，雖然設有董事會，但實際權力多掌握在政府部門與黨組織手中。隨著制度成熟，中國逐步引入現代公司法、獨立董事制度、審計委員會，以及與國際接軌的資訊披露要求。時至今日，中國的企業管治呈現出一種「雙軌結構」。一方面，中國證券監督管理委員會負責監管資本市場，制定上市規則、披露標準與公司管治守則，在形式上與成熟市場相當接近；另一方面，國務院國有資產監督管理委員會則以國家股東代表的角色，深度介入大型國有企業的董事任命、高管考核與策略方向。對潛在大型投資者而言，中國市場的吸引力在於其規模、流動性與不斷提升的透明度，而主要風險則在於控制權、政治目標與股東價值之間未必完全一致。因此，投資中國不僅需要財務分析，更需要清晰理解企業所有權結構、國家影響力與監管訊號。

相較之下，巴西的企業管治改革更具市場導向色彩。歷史上，巴西企業普遍存在所有權高度集中、非表決權股份盛行、以及少數股東保護薄弱等問題。為回應這些缺陷，巴西證券交易所推出了分級上市制度，其中最具代表性的是 Novo Mercado（新市場），其公司管治要求明顯高於法定最低標準。這一制度證明，企業管治的改善可以由市場力量推動，並對企業估值與投資者信心產生正面影響。對家族企業而言，巴西經驗中特別值得借鑒的是家族管治機制，尤其是家族委員會的角色。對一間由兩代家族成員共同持有的大型家族企業而言，家族委員會可成為一個正式平台，將家族事務與企業經營清楚區分。其好處包括促進跨世代溝通、就股息政策、接班安排及家族成員任用建立共識，並降低家族衝突干擾董事會運作的風險。同時，它有助於在不削弱家族控制權的情況下提升專業化程度。當然，設立家族委員會亦有成本，包括時間投入、可能需要外部顧問，以及設計不當時流於形式的風險。巴西的經驗顯示，只要家族委員會職權清晰、與董事會有所區隔，並專注於長期家族與企業的共同利益，便能同時提升家族和諧與企業韌性。

南韓則展現了另一種企業管治模式，其經濟由大型企業集團（財閥）主導。南韓多家知名上市公司，如三星電子、現代汽車及 SK 海力士，均具備世界級競爭力，但其管治結構長期受到創辦家族控制的影響。以三星電子為例，過去十多年來，公司在形式上大幅強化企業管治，包括提升董事會獨立性、實務上區分董事長與行政總裁角色、改善資訊披露，以及更積極地與國際投資者溝通。然而，在實質層面，最終控制權仍透過股權結構與集團內部影響力，與李氏家族緊密相連。這形成了一種混合式的企業管治模式：對外高度符合國際最佳實務，對內則深植於家族與集團控制之中。對投資者而言，關鍵並非假設形式上的趨同等同於實質上的一致，而是深入評估董事會是否具備挑戰控股股東的能力、是否能妥善處理接班問題，以及如何在集團利益與少數股東權益之間取得平衡。

綜合中國、巴西與南韓的經驗，可以看到新興市場企業管治的一個核心現象：制度形式的趨同速度，往往快於權力結構的實質改變。公司守則、委員會設置與披露框架愈來愈接近成熟市場，但國家所有權、家族資本主義與企業集團控制等深層結構，仍深刻影響實際管治結果。對投資者而言，這意味著企業管治分析必須超越清單式檢查，聚焦於誰真正掌握策略與資本配置權力。對企業擁有人，特別是家族企業而言，清晰而有效的管治機制——如家族委員會與具獨立性的董事會——並非限制，而是確保企業延續性、建立市場信譽及實現長期價值創造的重要工具。

How Communication Shapes Trust and Governance in Global Asset Management

Governance is rarely decided in dramatic boardroom moments. It is shaped quietly and persistently by the quality of information directors receive, the discipline of how decisions are framed, and the consistency with which an organisation communicates with its owners, regulators, clients, and employees. The familiar “six Cs” of board effectiveness—competence, commitment, contribution, challenge, collaboration, and culture—are not abstract ideals. They are revealed most clearly in communications, because communications show what a board chooses to make transparent, what it chooses to control, and how seriously it treats accountability.

In the asset management industry, communications carry particular weight. Asset managers operate as fiduciaries while simultaneously acting as interpreters of complexity for a wide range of stakeholders. Their credibility depends not only on investment performance but also on how clearly and consistently they explain governance, stewardship, risk, and long-term intent. When communications are deliberate and well-governed, they act as a form of board-level control that reduces information asymmetry and builds trust. When they are fragmented or reactive, they amplify reputational and regulatory risk, especially during periods of market stress.

A review of several leading asset managers’ public communications suggests that the strongest firms treat communications as a governance discipline rather than a marketing function. BlackRock’s investor-facing materials are highly structured and easy to navigate, with governance disclosures and shareholder engagement presented as part of an ongoing system rather than a one-off compliance exercise. The prominence given to proxy materials, governance principles, and engagement outcomes signals a board that understands communication as integral to oversight and accountability.

Invesco similarly demonstrates a governed approach to communication through its published governance documents and explicit guidelines on how communications with investors, analysts, and the media are handled. The existence of defined channels for shareholder communication with the board suggests a conscious effort to balance openness with control, reducing the risk of inconsistent messaging while preserving legitimate engagement.

Neuberger Berman, as a privately held firm, naturally places less emphasis on shareholder investor relations. Nevertheless, its disclosures, fund governance materials, and regional media-relations structures indicate a deliberate stakeholder communications posture. The emphasis shifts from equity investors to clients, regulators, and fund investors, but the underlying discipline—clarity of channels, formality of disclosure, and respect for governance boundaries—remains evident.

T. Rowe Price stands out for the clarity with which its governance guidelines describe the board’s role in shareholder communications. The expectation that board leadership should be available, where appropriate, to engage with shareholders reflects a strong board-level view of communication as part of fiduciary responsibility, not merely an operational task delegated to management.

Franklin Resources presents a similarly institutionalised approach, with governance documents clearly accessible and proxy disclosures describing structured engagement with shareholders involving multiple governance-related functions. This signals a mature internal process in which feedback from stakeholders is gathered, synthesised, and fed back into board-level discussion and disclosure.

Across these firms, a consistent pattern emerges. Listed asset managers tend to rely on a repeatable disclosure architecture—annual reports, proxy statements, governance guidelines, and regular engagement cycles—to communicate with shareholders. Privately held firms emphasise stakeholder governance through fund disclosures and client-facing transparency. In both cases, the strongest examples treat communications as a controlled system with defined pathways, rather than as ad hoc responses to external pressure. The lesson for boards is clear: communication is one of the most scalable and effective tools of governance.

This perspective has direct implications for how directors are prepared and supported. A well-designed director induction programme is not a formality but a risk-management tool. New directors need early and structured exposure to the organisation’s strategy, business model, financial drivers, risk profile, regulatory environment, and governance architecture. They must also understand board norms, information standards, decision-making processes, and the boundaries between governance and management. Effective induction shortens the time it takes for directors to contribute meaningfully and reduces the likelihood of silent disengagement or misplaced reliance on others.

Director development does not end with induction. In an environment shaped by rapid regulatory change, geopolitical tension, digital transformation, and evolving client expectations, boards must commit to continuous learning. Regular briefings on emerging risks, jurisdiction-specific regulatory developments, and strategic shifts help directors maintain the competence required by their fiduciary duties. Structured board evaluations, skills-matrix reviews, and targeted training reinforce a culture in which challenge is informed rather than performative.

Directors’ and officers’ insurance plays an important supporting role in this ecosystem, but it should never be mistaken for a substitute for good governance. Directors should understand the scope and limits of D&O coverage, including exclusions, territorial reach, and claims-handling processes. Treated properly, D&O insurance is one element of a broader framework that supports confident, independent judgement while reinforcing the expectation of high standards of conduct and diligence.

For the chairman of a global asset manager such as Fidelity International, especially one with significant reach across APAC and China, the path to greater board effectiveness lies less in structural overhaul and more in strengthening operating discipline. An explicit board-level communications policy would clarify who speaks for the firm, how stakeholder feedback reaches the board, and how sensitive information is controlled. Improving the architecture of board papers—forcing clarity on decisions required, options considered, risks accepted, and outcomes expected—would materially raise the quality of challenge and debate.

At a global level, the board should receive a consistent core view of performance and risk, complemented by regional overlays that highlight regulatory, operational, and reputational nuances in APAC and China. Induction and ongoing education should be designed to expose directors early to regional leadership and realities, ensuring that global decisions are informed by local context without fragmenting accountability.

Ultimately, the chairman’s most powerful lever is tone and discipline. By treating communications, induction, and continuous learning as integral parts of governance rather than administrative necessities, the chair can foster a board culture that is confident, curious, and cohesive. In a global asset manager, where trust is the most valuable asset of all, this approach turns governance from a defensive function into a source of strategic strength.

溝通如何塑造全球資產管理中的信任與治理

企業治理很少是在戲劇化的董事會瞬間中被決定的。它往往是在更安靜、更持續的層面上被塑造——體現在董事收到的資訊品質、決策被呈現與討論的紀律，以及組織與其股東、監管機構、客戶和員工溝通的一致性之中。董事會有效性的「六個 C」——能力、投入、貢獻、質疑、協作與文化——並非抽象的理想，而是最清楚地反映在溝通之中，因為溝通揭示了董事會選擇透明化的內容、選擇加以管控的事項，以及其對問責的重視程度。

在資產管理行業中，溝通的重要性尤為突出。資產管理公司既是受託人，同時也是市場複雜性的「翻譯者」，面對的對象包括各類投資者、顧問、監管機構與（對上市公司而言）股東。其公信力不僅取決於投資績效，也取決於其如何清晰而一致地說明治理、受託責任、風險與長期意圖。當溝通是經過深思熟慮並受到良好治理時，它就成為一種董事會層級的控制機制，有助於降低資訊不對稱並建立信任；反之，若溝通零散或被動，則在市場波動或外界審視加劇時，特別容易放大聲譽與合規風險。

檢視多家領先資產管理公司的公開溝通方式，可以發現最成熟的企業都將溝通視為一項治理紀律，而非單純的市場行銷功能。以貝萊德為例，其面向投資者的資料結構清晰、易於查閱，治理披露與股東參與被呈現為一個持續運作的體系，而非一次性的合規動作。代理文件、治理原則與參與成果所佔據的顯著位置，傳遞出一個訊號：董事會將溝通視為監督與問責不可分割的一部分。

景順投資同樣展現出受治理的溝通方式，其公開的治理文件以及對投資者、分析師與媒體溝通的明確指引，顯示出清楚的制度設計。為股東與董事會之間設置正式溝通管道，反映出在開放性與訊息管控之間取得平衡的用心，既降低了訊息不一致的風險，也保留了正當參與的空間。

作為一家非上市公司，Neuberger Berman 在股東投資人關係上的著墨自然較少，但其披露安排、基金治理資料與區域媒體關係架構，仍顯示出審慎的利害關係人溝通立場。重點從公開股權投資者轉向客戶、監管機構與基金投資人，但其背後的紀律——清楚的溝通管道、正式的披露方式，以及對治理邊界的尊重——依然清晰可見。

普信集團（T. Rowe Price）則以其治理指引中對董事會在股東溝通角色的清晰描述而脫穎而出。當治理文件明確指出董事會領導層在適當情況下應與股東互動時，這反映出一種強烈的董事會層級觀點：溝通本身就是受託責任的一部分，而非完全可以交由管理層處理的事務。

富蘭克林資源（Franklin Resources）亦展現出高度制度化的作法，其治理文件易於查閱，而代理聲明中對股東參與的描述，顯示出一套結構化的流程，涉及多個與治理相關的內部職能。這傳遞出一個成熟的內部訊號：利害關係人的回饋會被系統性地蒐集、整合，並回饋至董事會層級的討論與披露之中。

綜觀這些企業，可以看到一個清楚的模式。上市資產管理公司通常依賴一套可重複使用的披露架構——年度報告、代理聲明、治理指引與定期的參與機制——來與股東溝通；非上市公司則更強調基金治理與客戶層面的透明度。無論結構如何，最出色的案例都將溝通視為一個具備清楚路徑與控制機制的系統，而非臨時回應外部壓力的手段。對董事會而言，這意味著溝通是最具規模效應、也最有效的治理工具之一。

這樣的觀點，直接影響董事如何被準備與支持。一個設計良好的董事入職與導向計畫，並非形式上的安排，而是一項風險管理工具。新任董事需要在早期便有系統地理解公司的策略、商業模式、財務動因、風險概況、監管環境與治理架構，同時也必須熟悉董事會的運作規範、資訊標準、決策流程，以及治理與管理之間的界線。有效的導向計畫可以縮短董事發揮實質貢獻的時間，並降低因不確定或過度依賴他人而導致的治理風險。

董事發展並不會在入職後結束。在一個受到快速監管變化、地緣政治緊張、數位轉型與客戶期望演進所塑造的環境中，董事會必須持續學習。定期就新興風險、各司法管轄區的監管發展與策略變化進行簡報，有助於董事維持其受託責任所要求的能力水準。結構化的董事會評估、技能矩陣檢視與針對性的培訓，能夠強化一種文化——質疑是基於理解，而非表演式的對立。

董事與高級管理人員責任保險在此體系中扮演著重要的輔助角色，但它絕不應被誤解為良好治理的替代品。董事應清楚了解 D&O 保險的保障範圍與限制，包括除外條款、地域適用性以及理賠處理機制。正確看待 D&O 保險，它只是更廣泛治理風險框架中的一個組成部分，用以支持董事在高標準行為與審慎義務之下，能夠獨立而自信地行使判斷。

對於像富達國際這樣在亞太與中國具有重要佈局的全球資產管理公司而言，提升董事會效能的關鍵，與其說在於結構性的重大調整，不如說在於營運紀律的深化。建立一套明確的董事會層級溝通政策，有助於釐清誰代表公司發聲、利害關係人的回饋如何上達董事會，以及敏感資訊如何被妥善管控。提升董事會文件的資訊架構，強制清楚呈現需要作出的決策、曾考慮的選項、所承擔的風險與預期成果，將實質性地提高質疑與討論的品質。

在全球層面，董事會應看到一致的核心績效與風險視圖，同時配合區域性的補充資訊，以突顯亞太與中國在監管、營運與聲譽方面的特殊性。董事導向與持續教育也應以全球視角設計，讓董事及早接觸區域領導團隊與在地現實，確保全球決策能夠建立在充分理解地方脈絡的基礎之上，而不致削弱整體問責。

歸根究底，主席最有力的槓桿在於定調與紀律。當溝通、董事導向與持續學習被視為治理不可分割的一部分，而非行政性的必要工作時，董事會文化就能變得更自信、更好奇，也更具凝聚力。在全球資產管理公司中，信任是最珍貴的資產，而這樣的治理方式，能夠讓治理從防禦性的要求，轉化為真正的策略優勢。

What Truly Defines an Effective Director

Corporate governance ultimately rises or falls on the quality of the individuals who sit around the board table. Committees, codes, and structures matter, but they are only as effective as the judgment, integrity, and competence of the directors who operate them. At a time when boards are expected to oversee strategy, risk, culture, and trust simultaneously, the appointment and conduct of directors deserves far more deliberate thought than a simple review of CVs and reputations.

A disciplined approach to appointing directors begins with clarity on what the board actually needs. A pro forma checklist for director appointment should start with core competencies: strategic thinking and the ability to assess long-term value creation; financial literacy sufficient to interrogate accounts, capital allocation, and incentives; risk and governance expertise; relevant industry or market knowledge; and experience engaging regulators and major stakeholders. Alongside these sit personal attributes that are harder to measure but equally critical: integrity, independence of mind, sound judgment, emotional intelligence, resilience under pressure, and the courage to challenge executives constructively. The checklist should also ask whether the candidate can devote sufficient time, manage conflicts of interest transparently, and contribute to board diversity in experience, perspective, and thinking style. Used properly, such a checklist shifts appointments away from patronage or familiarity and toward board effectiveness.

Ethical expectations of directors are often framed through well-known public standards. In the UK, Lord Nolan articulated the seven principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. These principles translate remarkably well to directors of listed companies, particularly in areas such as integrity, accountability, openness, and leadership. However, listed company directors also operate within a commercial mandate to create long-term shareholder value, which sometimes requires competitive confidentiality, strategic discretion, and risk-taking that would be inappropriate in public office. In a private, family-owned firm, the Nolan principles still matter, but they are often filtered through family values, legacy considerations, and concentrated ownership, where accountability mechanisms are more informal and reputational rather than market-based. The principles remain relevant, but the context in which they are applied changes materially.

For a newly appointed director of a listed company, understanding legal duties is not optional, it is foundational. Directors are required to act in good faith in the best interests of the company as a whole, exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence, avoid conflicts of interest, and not misuse their position or inside information. They must comply with company law, securities regulation, and the company’s constitution, while ensuring proper oversight of financial reporting, risk management, and disclosure. In practice, many directors underestimate the breadth and personal nature of these duties, particularly the extent to which liability can attach to inaction, excessive reliance on management, or failure to question assumptions. Formal induction helps, but real understanding usually develops only through experience, ongoing education, and exposure to difficult board decisions.

Board structure adds another layer of complexity, especially in cross-border situations. Many major European companies, particularly in Germany, operate a two-tier board system comprising a supervisory board and a separate executive board. The supervisory board focuses on oversight, strategy approval, and executive appointments, while the executive board manages day-to-day operations. Directors of a company incorporated in Delaware considering the acquisition of a German subsidiary must recognize that this is not merely a cosmetic difference. Decision rights, information flows, employee representation, and fiduciary expectations are structured differently. Attempting to impose a US-style unitary board mindset on a German subsidiary can create governance friction, regulatory risk, and cultural misunderstanding. The more effective approach is to respect the local two-tier model, ensure clear reporting and escalation mechanisms to the group board, and invest time in educating US directors on how supervisory boards operate in practice.

Ultimately, strong corporate governance is less about formal compliance and more about character, competence, and context. High-performing boards are built deliberately, guided by clear principles, informed by legal reality, and adapted intelligently to different governance systems. Directors who understand this are better equipped not only to protect the company, but to steward it responsibly for the long term.

什麼才是真正界定一位高效能董事的關鍵？

企業治理的成敗，最終取決於圍繞董事會桌旁的那一群人。制度、守則與架構固然重要，但它們的效能，終究取決於董事所具備的判斷力、誠信與專業能力。在當今環境下，董事會同時被期望監督策略、風險、企業文化與信任，董事的遴選與行為，理應受到比單純檢視履歷與名聲更嚴謹的對待。

一個有紀律的董事任命流程，始於對董事會實際需求的清楚認知。董事任命的範本檢核表，應首先聚焦於核心能力：具備策略思維與評估長期價值創造的能力；足以審視財務報表、資本配置與激勵制度的財務素養；風險與公司治理專業；相關產業或市場的理解；以及與監管機構與主要利害關係人互動的經驗。與此同時，還必須評估那些較難量化、卻同樣關鍵的個人特質：誠信、獨立思考、穩健判斷力、情緒智商、在壓力下的韌性，以及能以建設性方式挑戰管理層的勇氣。檢核表亦應涵蓋候選人是否能投入足夠時間、是否能透明處理利益衝突，以及是否能在經驗、觀點與思維方式上為董事會帶來多元性。妥善運用此類工具，有助於將董事任命從人情與熟悉度，轉向真正以董事會效能為導向。

對董事的道德期待，往往可從公共領域的行為準則中找到參考。在英國，諾蘭勳爵提出了七項公共生活原則：無私、誠信、客觀、公信力、透明、誠實與領導力。這些原則在很大程度上，同樣適用於上市公司董事，特別是在誠信、問責、透明與領導方面。然而，上市公司董事同時肩負創造長期股東價值的商業責任，這有時意味著必須保有競爭上的保密性、策略上的審慎，以及承擔風險的決策空間，這些在公共職位中未必合適。若是在私人家族企業中，諾蘭原則仍然重要，但往往會透過家族價值、傳承考量與高度集中的所有權結構來體現，其問責機制更多是非正式與聲譽導向，而非市場導向。原則本身仍然適用，但實踐的情境已明顯不同。

對於新獲委任的上市公司董事而言，理解法律責任並非選項，而是基本要求。董事必須本於善意，為公司整體的最佳利益行事；履行合理的注意義務、技能與勤勉義務；避免利益衝突；不得濫用職權或公司內幕資訊；並遵守公司法、證券法規與公司章程。同時，董事亦須確保對財務申報、風險管理與資訊披露的適當監督。實務上，許多董事低估了這些責任的廣度與個人性，特別是未作為、過度依賴管理層，或未能質疑假設所可能帶來的責任風險。正式的董事入職培訓固然有幫助，但真正的理解，往往來自實際經驗、持續學習，以及面對艱難董事會決策時的歷練。

董事會架構在跨境情境中更顯複雜。許多歐洲大型企業，尤其是在德國，採用雙層董事會制度，由監事會與執行董事會分別組成。監事會負責監督、批准策略及任命高階管理層，而執行董事會則負責日常經營。對於在美國德拉瓦州註冊、並考慮收購德國子公司的公司董事而言，這並非表面上的制度差異，而是實質上的治理邏輯差異。決策權限、資訊流通、員工代表制度以及受託責任的安排，皆有所不同。若試圖將美式單一董事會的思維強加於德國子公司，往往會引發治理摩擦、監管風險與文化誤解。更有效的做法，是尊重當地的雙層董事會制度，建立清晰的集團層級匯報與升級機制，並投資時間協助美國董事理解監事會在實務中的運作方式。

歸根究柢，良好的公司治理，並不僅是合規問題，而是關於品格、能力與情境理解。高效能的董事會，是經過深思熟慮而建立的，以清楚的原則為指引，以法律現實為基礎，並能智慧地適應不同的治理體系。真正理解這一點的董事，不僅能保護企業，更能以負責任的方式，引領企業實現長期價值。

Raising Corporate Governance Standards in Hong Kong’s NGO and Community Sector

Hong Kong’s voluntary and community organisations and NGOs operate in a high-trust space of society. They deliver welfare services, mobilise volunteers, and often manage public or donated funds on behalf of the community. That combination of mission, money, and trust is precisely why corporate governance matters so deeply in the non-profit sector. Governance in this context is not about bureaucracy or copying listed-company rules, but about safeguarding legitimacy, stewardship, and public confidence over the long term.

A defining feature of Hong Kong’s NGO landscape is its diversity. NGOs can be constituted in multiple legal forms and fall under different regulatory and supervisory regimes. This flexibility has enabled a vibrant civil society to flourish, but it also means that governance practices vary widely between organisations that may otherwise look similar in scale or mission. Internationally, mature charity jurisdictions do not eliminate such diversity; instead, they establish consistent minimum expectations around accountability, transparency, fiduciary duty, and financial stewardship.

There are clear signs that Hong Kong already aligns, in intent, with international governance norms for civil society. Sector-specific guidance exists, particularly for subvented organisations, that explicitly sets out good governance practices for boards. Integrity and internal control toolkits are widely available, offering practical guidance on procurement, financial controls, and anti-corruption measures that mirror international expectations of stewardship and ethical conduct. Civil-society umbrella bodies curate governance resources and checklists that help normalise expectations across the sector, while local guidance exists to translate abstract governance principles into workable governance manuals and board processes. Taken together, these elements show that Hong Kong’s NGO sector is not operating without a governance framework or shared reference points.

However, conformity with international norms increasingly depends not only on the availability of guidance but on assurance that good practices are actually adopted. Fragmented oversight across different legal forms can result in uneven transparency and board discipline. Tax recognition and eligibility for public donations, while important, do not in themselves guarantee robust governance. As a result, stronger organisations often go beyond minimum requirements voluntarily, while weaker ones may remain lightly governed until a crisis forces change. International experience suggests that reliance on voluntary uptake alone tends to produce governance gaps that undermine public trust over time.

Global norms in civil-society governance are converging around a small number of core expectations. These include routine transparency through annual reporting and financial disclosure scaled to organisational risk, clear board accountability supported by conflict-of-interest management and board evaluation, integrity systems that address procurement and whistleblowing, responsiveness to stakeholders such as donors and beneficiaries, and a growing emphasis on measuring outcomes rather than simply reporting activities. These expectations do not require NGOs to become corporate in character, but they do require governance to be intentional and demonstrable.

From a public-policy perspective, the challenge for government is to raise the governance floor without over-regulating the ceiling. A proportionate baseline applicable across NGO forms, focused on conflicts, financial oversight, and basic disclosure, would strengthen trust while preserving flexibility. Public funding and subvention could be more explicitly linked to governance assurance, not just programme delivery, reinforcing the idea that stewardship is inseparable from service. A single, accessible transparency layer—allowing citizens and donors to see basic governance and financial information—would align Hong Kong with international expectations of openness. Finally, continued investment in board capability-building would recognise that governance quality ultimately depends on people, not rules.

From the perspective of an NGO chair or chairman, successful governance begins with a clear understanding that the board’s primary role is to govern trust. The board is collectively responsible for fiduciary oversight, mission integrity, and long-term sustainability. This requires directors to understand their duties, to manage conflicts openly, and to make informed decisions even when those decisions are uncomfortable. Where boards fail, it is often because roles blur, with directors drifting into management while executives lose accountability for outcomes.

Effective governance depends on a clear separation between governance and management, supported by documented processes rather than personal memory or goodwill. Even a lean governance manual can stabilise an organisation through leadership changes and growth by clarifying authority, committee structures, financial controls, and escalation paths. Integrity systems and internal controls should be scaled to the organisation’s risk profile, recognising that reputational damage in the non-profit sector can be existential. Transparency, even when not legally mandated, signals respect for donors and beneficiaries and reduces the space for suspicion to grow.

Board renewal and evaluation are equally important. Long-serving boards can lose independence and challenge, while skills gaps may emerge as organisations evolve. Regular reflection on board effectiveness, coupled with thoughtful succession planning, keeps governance aligned with the organisation’s mission and operating context. For a chair, a practical governance agenda does not need to be complex. Confirming conflict-of-interest policies, financial oversight routines, procurement controls, transparency commitments, and board performance review processes can materially strengthen governance within a short time frame.

Ultimately, governance is the social licence that allows NGOs to operate with credibility. In companies it protects shareholder value; in government it protects legitimacy; in voluntary and community organisations it protects moral authority. Hong Kong already has the ingredients of sound NGO governance in place through guidance, integrity frameworks, and sector leadership. The task ahead is to ensure these norms are consistently embedded in practice so that public trust is not assumed, but continually earned.

提升香港非政府組織及社區界別的企業管治水平

香港的志願及社區組織與非政府組織（NGO）運作於一個高度依賴信任的社會空間之中。它們提供社會福利服務、動員義工，並且往往代表社會管理公共資源或捐贈資金。正正是這種使命、資金與信任的結合，使企業管治在非牟利界別中顯得格外重要。在這個語境下，管治並非為了增加官僚程序，亦不是簡單套用上市公司的規則，而是為了長遠地守護組織的合法性、資源的妥善管理，以及公眾的信心。

香港非政府組織生態的一個關鍵特徵，是其制度上的多樣性。非政府組織可以採用多種不同的法律形式成立，並受不同的監管及監督機構規管。這種彈性促成了蓬勃而多元的公民社會，但同時亦導致即使在規模或使命相近的情況下，不同組織之間的管治實踐仍然存在顯著差異。在國際層面，成熟的慈善制度並不會消除這種多樣性，而是透過建立一致的最低期望，確保問責、透明度、受託責任及財務管理等核心原則得以落實。

從制度設計的角度來看，香港其實已在理念上與國際非牟利管治規範接軌。針對受資助機構的管治指引已經存在，並明確說明董事會應如何實踐良好管治。廉潔與內部監控的工具亦相當齊備，為採購、財務管理及反貪措施提供實務指引，這些內容與國際對資源管理及道德操守的期望高度一致。民間組織的支援平台亦整理了大量管治資源與檢核清單，有助於在整個界別中建立共通標準。此外，本地亦已有相關指引，協助組織將抽象的管治原則轉化為可操作的管治手冊與董事會程序。整體而言，這些元素顯示香港的非政府組織界別並非缺乏管治框架或共同參考點。

然而，是否真正符合國際管治規範，愈來愈取決於良好實踐是否被實際採納，而不只是是否存在指引。由於法律形式與監管制度分散，不同組織之間在透明度及董事會紀律方面容易出現不一致。稅務認可及捐款扣稅資格雖然重要，但本身並不足以確保健全的管治。因此，較成熟的組織往往自願超越最低要求，而管治較薄弱的組織則可能一直維持低標準，直至出現危機或醜聞才被迫改革。國際經驗顯示，單靠自願採納往往會產生管治落差，長遠而言削弱公眾信任。

在全球層面，公民社會的管治標準正逐步收斂至若干核心要求。這些包括按組織規模與風險定期披露年報與財務資料、清晰的董事會問責機制與利益衝突管理、涵蓋採購與舉報機制的誠信制度、對捐助者與服務對象的回應能力，以及對項目成效而非僅是活動數量的關注。這些要求並不意味非政府組織必須變得企業化，而是要求其管治必須有意識地建立，並且能夠被外界理解與檢視。

從公共政策角度而言，政府面對的挑戰在於提高整體管治下限，同時避免對上限過度干預。若能建立一套適用於不同非政府組織形式的基本管治要求，聚焦於利益衝突、財務監督及基本披露，既可強化公眾信心，亦可保留制度彈性。公共資助與撥款亦可更明確地與管治保證掛鈎，而不僅僅是服務輸出，從而傳遞一個清晰訊息：良好管治與良好服務不可分割。建立一個集中而易於查閱的透明平台，讓市民與捐助者能夠了解基本的管治及財務資料，亦將有助香港與國際透明度期望接軌。最後，持續投放資源於董事會能力建設，反映出一個關鍵現實：管治的質素最終取決於人，而不是規則本身。

對於一間非政府組織的主席或主席而言，成功的管治始於清楚理解董事會的首要角色，是守護信任。董事會須共同承擔受託責任，確保使命的完整性及組織的長遠可持續性。這要求董事理解自身責任，能夠公開而理性地處理利益衝突，並在必要時作出艱難但負責任的決定。許多管治失效的情況，往往源於角色混淆，董事會過度介入管理，而行政層則失去對成果的清晰責任。

有效的管治依賴於清楚區分管治與管理，並以制度化文件支撐，而非僅靠個人記憶或善意。即使是一份精簡的管治手冊，也能在領導層更替或組織成長過程中發揮穩定作用，清楚界定權限、委員會安排、財務控制及危機處理流程。誠信制度與內部監控亦應按組織風險程度設計，因為在非牟利界別中，聲譽受損往往是致命的。即使法律並無強制要求，主動披露資訊亦是對捐助者及服務對象的尊重，並可減少因資訊不足而產生的猜疑。

董事會更新與評估同樣不可或缺。長期未更新的董事會容易失去獨立性與挑戰能力，而隨着組織發展，能力缺口亦可能逐漸浮現。透過定期檢視董事會成效，並配合審慎的繼任規劃，可確保管治結構與組織使命及營運環境保持一致。對主席而言，一個務實的管治議程未必需要複雜，只要在短時間內確認利益衝突政策、財務監督節奏、採購控制、透明度承諾及董事會表現檢視機制，已可大幅提升管治質素。

歸根究柢，管治是非政府組織得以運作的社會授權。在企業中，管治保障股東價值；在政府中，管治保障合法性；而在志願及社區組織中，管治保障的是道德權威。香港已具備良好非政府組織管治的基礎條件，包括指引、誠信框架及界別領導。未來的關鍵，在於確保這些規範能夠在實務中持續而一致地落實，使公眾信任不再只是被假設，而是被不斷地贏得。

Power, Structure, and Transparency in Global Corporate Groups

Corporate governance is often discussed in abstract terms, yet it is best understood through the structures, behaviours, and disclosure practices of real organizations. When we examine how large groups are organised, how power is distributed between holding companies and subsidiaries, and how transparently these arrangements are communicated to shareholders, governance stops being theoretical and becomes operational. Few companies illustrate this better than General Electric, alongside the distinctive corporate structures commonly seen among listed companies in Hong Kong.

GE presents a clear example of governance as an active discipline rather than a compliance exercise. The company positions its board as a steward of long-term value, explicitly focusing on strategy, risk management, and people. This emphasis signals a mature governance philosophy, one that recognises that shareholder value is inseparable from operational resilience, leadership quality, and ethical culture. The governance principles published by GE reinforce the idea that the board’s role is not to manage day-to-day operations, but to challenge management constructively, set strategic direction, oversee enterprise risk, and ensure the organisation has the talent required to execute its ambitions. The impression formed is of a board that is engaged, informed, and institutionally confident, operating with clarity about where oversight ends and executive responsibility begins.

This clarity becomes especially important in a group context. GE is organised into multiple business units, each comprising a constellation of legal entities aligned around specific growth themes. If one were to serve on the board of a GE subsidiary, significant operational and tactical freedom would likely exist, particularly in adapting products, managing local risks, and executing within market-specific constraints. However, strategic freedom would not be absolute. The holding company board would retain authority over capital allocation, portfolio direction, risk appetite, leadership appointments, and alignment with group-wide values and governance standards. In effect, the subsidiary board would act as a steward of execution and local optimisation, while the holding company board would remain the guardian of coherence, discipline, and long-term direction across the group.

This balance between autonomy and control is not unique to GE, but it contrasts interestingly with the corporate structures seen among many listed companies in Hong Kong. A review of major Hong Kong–listed groups reveals complex structures involving multiple jurisdictions of incorporation, commonly including Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. Shares are typically listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, while operating subsidiaries may sit several layers below the listed entity. These arrangements often take the form of pyramidal or chained structures rather than flat networks, allowing effective control to be exercised with relatively limited capital at the top of the group.

Such structures are not inherently problematic. They can serve legitimate purposes, including regulatory compliance, tax efficiency, and risk segregation. However, they place a premium on disclosure quality. In Hong Kong, listed companies are generally good at providing statutory information, organisational charts, and high-level governance statements. Yet the depth and clarity of disclosure vary widely. In some cases, the group structure is presented transparently, with clear explanations of control, ownership percentages, and board responsibilities at different levels. In others, the structure is technically disclosed but difficult for minority shareholders to interpret, obscuring where real decision-making authority lies.

This contrast highlights a broader governance insight. Strong corporate governance is not defined solely by where a company is incorporated, how many independent directors sit on its board, or whether it complies with a code. It is defined by whether stakeholders can clearly understand how the group is governed, how risks flow through the structure, and how accountability is enforced across entities. GE’s governance framework demonstrates the power of explicit principles and disciplined group oversight. Hong Kong’s listed companies, operating in a market shaped by family ownership, cross-border capital, and historical conglomerate models, demonstrate the continuing tension between control efficiency and transparency.

For boards, investors, and regulators alike, the lesson is clear. As corporate groups become more international and structurally complex, governance must evolve from a legal formality into a communicative and strategic capability. Holding company boards must be explicit about their role, subsidiary boards must understand the boundaries of their autonomy, and disclosures must enable shareholders to see not just the shape of the group, but the flow of power within it. In an era of heightened stakeholder scrutiny, governance quality is no longer inferred, it is demonstrated.

全球企業集團中的權力、結構與透明度

企業治理經常以抽象的方式被討論，但唯有透過真實組織的結構、行為以及資訊披露實務，才能真正理解其內涵。當我們檢視大型企業集團如何被組織、控股公司與子公司之間的權力如何分配，以及這些安排如何向股東清楚說明時，企業治理便不再只是理論，而成為一種實際運作的能力。在這方面，美國通用電氣（GE）以及多家香港上市公司的公司結構，提供了極具啟發性的對照。

GE 展現了一種將企業治理視為主動管理紀律，而非被動合規要求的典型案例。該公司明確將董事會定位為長期價值的守護者，並將重點放在策略、風險管理與人才三個核心領域。這種取向反映出成熟的治理哲學，即股東價值與營運韌性、領導力品質及道德文化密不可分。GE 公開的治理原則進一步強調，董事會的角色並非參與日常管理，而是在於提供具建設性的挑戰、設定策略方向、監督企業層級風險，以及確保組織具備實現目標所需的人才。整體而言，GE 的董事會給人一種積極投入、資訊充分且對自身職責高度清楚的印象，能清楚區分監督責任與管理責任之間的界線。

這種清晰度在企業集團架構中尤為重要。GE 的組織方式是以多個事業單位為核心，每個事業單位下包含多家法律實體，並圍繞特定成長方向進行整合。如果擔任 GE 某一子公司的董事，預期在營運與戰術層面將享有相當程度的自主性，例如因應當地市場調整產品、管理在地風險，以及在既定框架下執行策略。然而，這種自主性並非毫無限制。控股公司董事會仍會保留對資本配置、集團投資組合方向、風險承擔程度、高階人事任命，以及集團價值觀與治理標準一致性的最終決定權。換言之，子公司董事會的角色在於確保策略有效落地與在地最佳化，而控股公司董事會則負責維持整體一致性、紀律與長期方向。

這種「授權與控制並存」的治理模式，與許多香港上市公司的結構形成有趣對比。檢視香港主要上市企業可以發現，其集團結構往往相當複雜，涉及多個註冊司法管轄區，常見包括香港、開曼群島及英屬維京群島。股份通常在香港交易所上市，而實際營運的子公司則可能位於集團架構的多層之下。這類安排多屬金字塔式或鏈式結構，而非扁平化網絡，使得集團能以相對有限的上層資本達成有效控制。

這些結構本身並非問題，它們往往有其合理目的，例如符合法規要求、提升稅務效率或進行風險隔離。然而，這類結構對資訊披露品質提出了更高要求。在香港，上市公司通常能夠提供法定資訊、組織架構圖以及高層次的治理聲明，但在透明度與可理解性方面仍存在顯著差異。有些公司能清楚說明集團結構、控制關係、持股比例以及不同層級董事會的職責；但也有些公司雖然形式上完成披露，卻使少數股東難以理解實際的決策權力流向。

這種差異揭示了一項更深層的治理洞見。良好的企業治理並不僅取決於公司註冊地、董事會中獨立董事的人數，或是否遵循某項治理守則。其核心在於，利害關係人能否清楚理解集團如何被治理、風險如何在結構中傳導，以及問責機制如何在不同實體之間落實。GE 的治理框架展現了清晰原則與嚴謹集團監督的力量；而香港上市公司則反映出在家族控制、跨境資本與傳統企業集團模式影響下，效率與透明度之間持續存在的張力。

對董事會、投資人與監管機構而言，這一點尤為重要。隨著企業集團日益國際化且結構更加複雜，企業治理必須從法律形式上的合規，演進為一種溝通能力與策略能力。控股公司董事會需要明確自身角色，子公司董事會必須理解其自主權的邊界，而資訊披露則應使股東不僅看見集團的外在結構，更能理解權力如何在其中運作。在高度監督與問責的時代，治理品質不再是被假定的，而是必須被清楚展現的。