2026

What Truly Defines an Effective Director

Corporate governance ultimately rises or falls on the quality of the individuals who sit around the board table. Committees, codes, and structures matter, but they are only as effective as the judgment, integrity, and competence of the directors who operate them. At a time when boards are expected to oversee strategy, risk, culture, and trust simultaneously, the appointment and conduct of directors deserves far more deliberate thought than a simple review of CVs and reputations.

A disciplined approach to appointing directors begins with clarity on what the board actually needs. A pro forma checklist for director appointment should start with core competencies: strategic thinking and the ability to assess long-term value creation; financial literacy sufficient to interrogate accounts, capital allocation, and incentives; risk and governance expertise; relevant industry or market knowledge; and experience engaging regulators and major stakeholders. Alongside these sit personal attributes that are harder to measure but equally critical: integrity, independence of mind, sound judgment, emotional intelligence, resilience under pressure, and the courage to challenge executives constructively. The checklist should also ask whether the candidate can devote sufficient time, manage conflicts of interest transparently, and contribute to board diversity in experience, perspective, and thinking style. Used properly, such a checklist shifts appointments away from patronage or familiarity and toward board effectiveness.

Ethical expectations of directors are often framed through well-known public standards. In the UK, Lord Nolan articulated the seven principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership. These principles translate remarkably well to directors of listed companies, particularly in areas such as integrity, accountability, openness, and leadership. However, listed company directors also operate within a commercial mandate to create long-term shareholder value, which sometimes requires competitive confidentiality, strategic discretion, and risk-taking that would be inappropriate in public office. In a private, family-owned firm, the Nolan principles still matter, but they are often filtered through family values, legacy considerations, and concentrated ownership, where accountability mechanisms are more informal and reputational rather than market-based. The principles remain relevant, but the context in which they are applied changes materially.

For a newly appointed director of a listed company, understanding legal duties is not optional, it is foundational. Directors are required to act in good faith in the best interests of the company as a whole, exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence, avoid conflicts of interest, and not misuse their position or inside information. They must comply with company law, securities regulation, and the company’s constitution, while ensuring proper oversight of financial reporting, risk management, and disclosure. In practice, many directors underestimate the breadth and personal nature of these duties, particularly the extent to which liability can attach to inaction, excessive reliance on management, or failure to question assumptions. Formal induction helps, but real understanding usually develops only through experience, ongoing education, and exposure to difficult board decisions.

Board structure adds another layer of complexity, especially in cross-border situations. Many major European companies, particularly in Germany, operate a two-tier board system comprising a supervisory board and a separate executive board. The supervisory board focuses on oversight, strategy approval, and executive appointments, while the executive board manages day-to-day operations. Directors of a company incorporated in Delaware considering the acquisition of a German subsidiary must recognize that this is not merely a cosmetic difference. Decision rights, information flows, employee representation, and fiduciary expectations are structured differently. Attempting to impose a US-style unitary board mindset on a German subsidiary can create governance friction, regulatory risk, and cultural misunderstanding. The more effective approach is to respect the local two-tier model, ensure clear reporting and escalation mechanisms to the group board, and invest time in educating US directors on how supervisory boards operate in practice.

Ultimately, strong corporate governance is less about formal compliance and more about character, competence, and context. High-performing boards are built deliberately, guided by clear principles, informed by legal reality, and adapted intelligently to different governance systems. Directors who understand this are better equipped not only to protect the company, but to steward it responsibly for the long term.

什麼才是真正界定一位高效能董事的關鍵？

企業治理的成敗，最終取決於圍繞董事會桌旁的那一群人。制度、守則與架構固然重要，但它們的效能，終究取決於董事所具備的判斷力、誠信與專業能力。在當今環境下，董事會同時被期望監督策略、風險、企業文化與信任，董事的遴選與行為，理應受到比單純檢視履歷與名聲更嚴謹的對待。

一個有紀律的董事任命流程，始於對董事會實際需求的清楚認知。董事任命的範本檢核表，應首先聚焦於核心能力：具備策略思維與評估長期價值創造的能力；足以審視財務報表、資本配置與激勵制度的財務素養；風險與公司治理專業；相關產業或市場的理解；以及與監管機構與主要利害關係人互動的經驗。與此同時，還必須評估那些較難量化、卻同樣關鍵的個人特質：誠信、獨立思考、穩健判斷力、情緒智商、在壓力下的韌性，以及能以建設性方式挑戰管理層的勇氣。檢核表亦應涵蓋候選人是否能投入足夠時間、是否能透明處理利益衝突，以及是否能在經驗、觀點與思維方式上為董事會帶來多元性。妥善運用此類工具，有助於將董事任命從人情與熟悉度，轉向真正以董事會效能為導向。

對董事的道德期待，往往可從公共領域的行為準則中找到參考。在英國，諾蘭勳爵提出了七項公共生活原則：無私、誠信、客觀、公信力、透明、誠實與領導力。這些原則在很大程度上，同樣適用於上市公司董事，特別是在誠信、問責、透明與領導方面。然而，上市公司董事同時肩負創造長期股東價值的商業責任，這有時意味著必須保有競爭上的保密性、策略上的審慎，以及承擔風險的決策空間，這些在公共職位中未必合適。若是在私人家族企業中，諾蘭原則仍然重要，但往往會透過家族價值、傳承考量與高度集中的所有權結構來體現，其問責機制更多是非正式與聲譽導向，而非市場導向。原則本身仍然適用，但實踐的情境已明顯不同。

對於新獲委任的上市公司董事而言，理解法律責任並非選項，而是基本要求。董事必須本於善意，為公司整體的最佳利益行事；履行合理的注意義務、技能與勤勉義務；避免利益衝突；不得濫用職權或公司內幕資訊；並遵守公司法、證券法規與公司章程。同時，董事亦須確保對財務申報、風險管理與資訊披露的適當監督。實務上，許多董事低估了這些責任的廣度與個人性，特別是未作為、過度依賴管理層，或未能質疑假設所可能帶來的責任風險。正式的董事入職培訓固然有幫助，但真正的理解，往往來自實際經驗、持續學習，以及面對艱難董事會決策時的歷練。

董事會架構在跨境情境中更顯複雜。許多歐洲大型企業，尤其是在德國，採用雙層董事會制度，由監事會與執行董事會分別組成。監事會負責監督、批准策略及任命高階管理層，而執行董事會則負責日常經營。對於在美國德拉瓦州註冊、並考慮收購德國子公司的公司董事而言，這並非表面上的制度差異，而是實質上的治理邏輯差異。決策權限、資訊流通、員工代表制度以及受託責任的安排，皆有所不同。若試圖將美式單一董事會的思維強加於德國子公司，往往會引發治理摩擦、監管風險與文化誤解。更有效的做法，是尊重當地的雙層董事會制度，建立清晰的集團層級匯報與升級機制，並投資時間協助美國董事理解監事會在實務中的運作方式。

歸根究柢，良好的公司治理，並不僅是合規問題，而是關於品格、能力與情境理解。高效能的董事會，是經過深思熟慮而建立的，以清楚的原則為指引，以法律現實為基礎，並能智慧地適應不同的治理體系。真正理解這一點的董事，不僅能保護企業，更能以負責任的方式，引領企業實現長期價值。

Raising Corporate Governance Standards in Hong Kong’s NGO and Community Sector

Hong Kong’s voluntary and community organisations and NGOs operate in a high-trust space of society. They deliver welfare services, mobilise volunteers, and often manage public or donated funds on behalf of the community. That combination of mission, money, and trust is precisely why corporate governance matters so deeply in the non-profit sector. Governance in this context is not about bureaucracy or copying listed-company rules, but about safeguarding legitimacy, stewardship, and public confidence over the long term.

A defining feature of Hong Kong’s NGO landscape is its diversity. NGOs can be constituted in multiple legal forms and fall under different regulatory and supervisory regimes. This flexibility has enabled a vibrant civil society to flourish, but it also means that governance practices vary widely between organisations that may otherwise look similar in scale or mission. Internationally, mature charity jurisdictions do not eliminate such diversity; instead, they establish consistent minimum expectations around accountability, transparency, fiduciary duty, and financial stewardship.

There are clear signs that Hong Kong already aligns, in intent, with international governance norms for civil society. Sector-specific guidance exists, particularly for subvented organisations, that explicitly sets out good governance practices for boards. Integrity and internal control toolkits are widely available, offering practical guidance on procurement, financial controls, and anti-corruption measures that mirror international expectations of stewardship and ethical conduct. Civil-society umbrella bodies curate governance resources and checklists that help normalise expectations across the sector, while local guidance exists to translate abstract governance principles into workable governance manuals and board processes. Taken together, these elements show that Hong Kong’s NGO sector is not operating without a governance framework or shared reference points.

However, conformity with international norms increasingly depends not only on the availability of guidance but on assurance that good practices are actually adopted. Fragmented oversight across different legal forms can result in uneven transparency and board discipline. Tax recognition and eligibility for public donations, while important, do not in themselves guarantee robust governance. As a result, stronger organisations often go beyond minimum requirements voluntarily, while weaker ones may remain lightly governed until a crisis forces change. International experience suggests that reliance on voluntary uptake alone tends to produce governance gaps that undermine public trust over time.

Global norms in civil-society governance are converging around a small number of core expectations. These include routine transparency through annual reporting and financial disclosure scaled to organisational risk, clear board accountability supported by conflict-of-interest management and board evaluation, integrity systems that address procurement and whistleblowing, responsiveness to stakeholders such as donors and beneficiaries, and a growing emphasis on measuring outcomes rather than simply reporting activities. These expectations do not require NGOs to become corporate in character, but they do require governance to be intentional and demonstrable.

From a public-policy perspective, the challenge for government is to raise the governance floor without over-regulating the ceiling. A proportionate baseline applicable across NGO forms, focused on conflicts, financial oversight, and basic disclosure, would strengthen trust while preserving flexibility. Public funding and subvention could be more explicitly linked to governance assurance, not just programme delivery, reinforcing the idea that stewardship is inseparable from service. A single, accessible transparency layer—allowing citizens and donors to see basic governance and financial information—would align Hong Kong with international expectations of openness. Finally, continued investment in board capability-building would recognise that governance quality ultimately depends on people, not rules.

From the perspective of an NGO chair or chairman, successful governance begins with a clear understanding that the board’s primary role is to govern trust. The board is collectively responsible for fiduciary oversight, mission integrity, and long-term sustainability. This requires directors to understand their duties, to manage conflicts openly, and to make informed decisions even when those decisions are uncomfortable. Where boards fail, it is often because roles blur, with directors drifting into management while executives lose accountability for outcomes.

Effective governance depends on a clear separation between governance and management, supported by documented processes rather than personal memory or goodwill. Even a lean governance manual can stabilise an organisation through leadership changes and growth by clarifying authority, committee structures, financial controls, and escalation paths. Integrity systems and internal controls should be scaled to the organisation’s risk profile, recognising that reputational damage in the non-profit sector can be existential. Transparency, even when not legally mandated, signals respect for donors and beneficiaries and reduces the space for suspicion to grow.

Board renewal and evaluation are equally important. Long-serving boards can lose independence and challenge, while skills gaps may emerge as organisations evolve. Regular reflection on board effectiveness, coupled with thoughtful succession planning, keeps governance aligned with the organisation’s mission and operating context. For a chair, a practical governance agenda does not need to be complex. Confirming conflict-of-interest policies, financial oversight routines, procurement controls, transparency commitments, and board performance review processes can materially strengthen governance within a short time frame.

Ultimately, governance is the social licence that allows NGOs to operate with credibility. In companies it protects shareholder value; in government it protects legitimacy; in voluntary and community organisations it protects moral authority. Hong Kong already has the ingredients of sound NGO governance in place through guidance, integrity frameworks, and sector leadership. The task ahead is to ensure these norms are consistently embedded in practice so that public trust is not assumed, but continually earned.

提升香港非政府組織及社區界別的企業管治水平

香港的志願及社區組織與非政府組織（NGO）運作於一個高度依賴信任的社會空間之中。它們提供社會福利服務、動員義工，並且往往代表社會管理公共資源或捐贈資金。正正是這種使命、資金與信任的結合，使企業管治在非牟利界別中顯得格外重要。在這個語境下，管治並非為了增加官僚程序，亦不是簡單套用上市公司的規則，而是為了長遠地守護組織的合法性、資源的妥善管理，以及公眾的信心。

香港非政府組織生態的一個關鍵特徵，是其制度上的多樣性。非政府組織可以採用多種不同的法律形式成立，並受不同的監管及監督機構規管。這種彈性促成了蓬勃而多元的公民社會，但同時亦導致即使在規模或使命相近的情況下，不同組織之間的管治實踐仍然存在顯著差異。在國際層面，成熟的慈善制度並不會消除這種多樣性，而是透過建立一致的最低期望，確保問責、透明度、受託責任及財務管理等核心原則得以落實。

從制度設計的角度來看，香港其實已在理念上與國際非牟利管治規範接軌。針對受資助機構的管治指引已經存在，並明確說明董事會應如何實踐良好管治。廉潔與內部監控的工具亦相當齊備，為採購、財務管理及反貪措施提供實務指引，這些內容與國際對資源管理及道德操守的期望高度一致。民間組織的支援平台亦整理了大量管治資源與檢核清單，有助於在整個界別中建立共通標準。此外，本地亦已有相關指引，協助組織將抽象的管治原則轉化為可操作的管治手冊與董事會程序。整體而言，這些元素顯示香港的非政府組織界別並非缺乏管治框架或共同參考點。

然而，是否真正符合國際管治規範，愈來愈取決於良好實踐是否被實際採納，而不只是是否存在指引。由於法律形式與監管制度分散，不同組織之間在透明度及董事會紀律方面容易出現不一致。稅務認可及捐款扣稅資格雖然重要，但本身並不足以確保健全的管治。因此，較成熟的組織往往自願超越最低要求，而管治較薄弱的組織則可能一直維持低標準，直至出現危機或醜聞才被迫改革。國際經驗顯示，單靠自願採納往往會產生管治落差，長遠而言削弱公眾信任。

在全球層面，公民社會的管治標準正逐步收斂至若干核心要求。這些包括按組織規模與風險定期披露年報與財務資料、清晰的董事會問責機制與利益衝突管理、涵蓋採購與舉報機制的誠信制度、對捐助者與服務對象的回應能力，以及對項目成效而非僅是活動數量的關注。這些要求並不意味非政府組織必須變得企業化，而是要求其管治必須有意識地建立，並且能夠被外界理解與檢視。

從公共政策角度而言，政府面對的挑戰在於提高整體管治下限，同時避免對上限過度干預。若能建立一套適用於不同非政府組織形式的基本管治要求，聚焦於利益衝突、財務監督及基本披露，既可強化公眾信心，亦可保留制度彈性。公共資助與撥款亦可更明確地與管治保證掛鈎，而不僅僅是服務輸出，從而傳遞一個清晰訊息：良好管治與良好服務不可分割。建立一個集中而易於查閱的透明平台，讓市民與捐助者能夠了解基本的管治及財務資料，亦將有助香港與國際透明度期望接軌。最後，持續投放資源於董事會能力建設，反映出一個關鍵現實：管治的質素最終取決於人，而不是規則本身。

對於一間非政府組織的主席或主席而言，成功的管治始於清楚理解董事會的首要角色，是守護信任。董事會須共同承擔受託責任，確保使命的完整性及組織的長遠可持續性。這要求董事理解自身責任，能夠公開而理性地處理利益衝突，並在必要時作出艱難但負責任的決定。許多管治失效的情況，往往源於角色混淆，董事會過度介入管理，而行政層則失去對成果的清晰責任。

有效的管治依賴於清楚區分管治與管理，並以制度化文件支撐，而非僅靠個人記憶或善意。即使是一份精簡的管治手冊，也能在領導層更替或組織成長過程中發揮穩定作用，清楚界定權限、委員會安排、財務控制及危機處理流程。誠信制度與內部監控亦應按組織風險程度設計，因為在非牟利界別中，聲譽受損往往是致命的。即使法律並無強制要求，主動披露資訊亦是對捐助者及服務對象的尊重，並可減少因資訊不足而產生的猜疑。

董事會更新與評估同樣不可或缺。長期未更新的董事會容易失去獨立性與挑戰能力，而隨着組織發展，能力缺口亦可能逐漸浮現。透過定期檢視董事會成效，並配合審慎的繼任規劃，可確保管治結構與組織使命及營運環境保持一致。對主席而言，一個務實的管治議程未必需要複雜，只要在短時間內確認利益衝突政策、財務監督節奏、採購控制、透明度承諾及董事會表現檢視機制，已可大幅提升管治質素。

歸根究柢，管治是非政府組織得以運作的社會授權。在企業中，管治保障股東價值；在政府中，管治保障合法性；而在志願及社區組織中，管治保障的是道德權威。香港已具備良好非政府組織管治的基礎條件，包括指引、誠信框架及界別領導。未來的關鍵，在於確保這些規範能夠在實務中持續而一致地落實，使公眾信任不再只是被假設，而是被不斷地贏得。